

# International Organizations in National Parliamentary Debates

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## Abstract

Which international organizations (IOs) are debated in national parliaments, and which ones receive less attention? When are IOs discussed, and what explains differences across legislatures? Parliaments are a central venue where domestic politics and international institutions intersect, yet we lack systemic evidence on how IOs matter in these key arenas of political contestation. Presenting a new dataset of almost 700,000 statements on IOs in parliamentary debates, this article tracks the salience of 75 IOs in six legislatures between 1990 and 2018 and reveals considerable variation in the extent to which IOs are talked about in different legislatures across countries, time, and parliaments. Interestingly, a considerable number of IOs are never mentioned at all in parliamentary speeches. Our analysis reveals that authority, the presence of international parliamentary institutions, and ratification periods are key predictors of an IO's salience in parliament. IOs are also less salient during election years. Our findings have implications for democratic accountability in IOs and for the domestic politics of international cooperation more broadly.

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# 1 Introduction

National parliaments are a central venue where domestic politics and international organizations (IOs) intersect. Domestic legislatures ratify international treaties, transpose internationally agreed policy into national law, and hold ministers to account by for their actions on the international stage. They also play an important role in the legitimation of IOs as institutions and for IO-related policies (Moravcsik 2004). Even though policymaking related to international organizations continues to be dominated by executives and the bureaucracy, national parliaments have also become more assertive over time (Raunio 2014). Many recent high-profile events surrounding international cooperation demonstrate the important role that national parliaments can play in IO politics. For example, the aftermath of the British Brexit referendum on EU exit was dominated by dramatic attempts to ratify a Brexit deal in the House of Commons. In 2013, the Kenyan National Assembly's decision to suspend all links with the International Criminal Court led to media coverage across the world. And for decades, the United States Congress has been subject to heated discussions on U.S financial contributions to international organizations such as NATO, the UN, and the World Bank.

However, despite these occasional bouts of intense parliamentary scrutiny, concerns that legislatures are relatively impotent in holding the executive to account for how they behave in IOs persist and are central to debates about the democratic accountability of IOs and the liberal international order more generally (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Rauh and De Wilde 2018; Kreuder-Sonnen and Rittberger 2023; Keohane, Macedo, and Moravcsik 2009; Gartzke and Naoi 2011). This suggests that more research about the role national parliaments play in the context of international organizations is needed to better assess questions of legitimacy and legitimation in global governance (Tallberg and Zürn 2019).

Despite this need, comparative research about the role of national parliaments in international policymaking is rare (Raunio 2014). For example, we lack systematic evidence about the extent to which IOs are debated in this central arena of political contestation. This is surprising, because parliamentarians have at least two important motivations to discuss IOs in parliamentary debates. First, ratification requirements or the need to transpose an IO-level decision into national law necessitates parliamentary debate. In addition to this more technical motivation, there is also a more political motivation because parliamentary debates offer a

platform to politicians to broadcast their policy positions. Both of these motivations are likely to vary across IO, time, legislatures and even across parties and individual parliamentarians (Malang 2019). Important research on IO-related parliamentary discourse has been made but either focuses only on individual IOs (Rauh and de Wilde 2018 Sternberg 2013, Born 2004, Lehmann 2023) or only on individual countries (Kahane 1996, Rauh 2015, Skaggs 2004). To provide a broader comparative perspective on the salience of international organizations in national parliamentary debates, this article therefore examines how much and which IOs are debated; when IOs are discussed in national parliaments, and which legislatures are most likely to discuss IOs.

Building on research about the politicization of international organizations, the democratic accountability and legitimacy of IOs, and research on the interplay between domestic politics and international politics more generally, we argue that the salience of international organization in national parliamentary discourse, that is the amount of references made to an individual IO in national plenary debates (Rauh and De Wilde 2018, 197), varies systematically across certain characteristics of an IO, across time, and across national legislatures. We argue that IOs with higher authority, general-purpose IOs, and those equipped with international parliamentary institutions are more likely to feature in national parliamentary debates. Moreover, salience is likely to be higher during ratification periods and during international crises, especially for IOs involved in managing the respective crises, and lower during national election campaigns. Finally, we expect legislatures to speak more about IOs in which their country is a member, when challenger parties are well-represented in the legislature, and expect the salience of IOs to decrease for legislatures facing a difficult national economic context.

We examine these hypotheses using a new dataset named *IOParlspeech*, which consists of over 600, 000 statements mentioning 75 different IOs, collected from all plenary speeches in six different legislatures, between 1990 and 2018. This data documents not just that IOs are mentioned regularly in parliamentary debates, but also reveals considerable variation in the extent to which IOs are talked about in different legislatures across countries, time, and legislatures. Interestingly, a considerable number of IOs are never mentioned at all in parliamentary speeches. Using multilevel negative binomial models, we find that general purpose IOs and IOs with higher levels of authority are more salient, that IOs with international

parliamentary institutions are more likely to be debated and that ratification periods have a large effect on an IO's salience in parliament. Election years, however, diminish the salience of IOs in parliament. IOs of which a country is a member are debated significantly more. However, not all of our hypotheses are confirmed: there is no significant relationship between the share of challenger parties in parliament and the number of mentions of IOs. Tough domestic economic conditions like high levels of unemployment are not associated with higher IO salience. And whilst international security crises somewhat increase the salience of security IOs, this interaction effect is not present for economic crises and economic IOs.

Our findings have several implications for concerns about the executive dominance of international affairs and democratic accountability in IOs (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Kreuder-Sonnen and Rittberger 2023; Rauh and De Wilde 2018). On the one hand, the fact that the ratification of international agreements is accompanied by highly salient parliamentary debate and that IOs with IPIs receive more parliamentary communication on IOs is encouraging from an accountability standpoint. At the same time, the fact that elections diminish the salience of IOs suggest voters are unlikely to be thinking of international cooperation at the ballot box. Additionally, the fact that many IOs receive no mentions at all suggest executive drift may be considerable in these. Overall, the article illustrates that national parliaments area an important venue to study the interaction between domestic and international politics and introduces a dataset likely to be of use to quantitative and qualitative scholars alike.

## **2. International Organizations in Parliamentary Debate: Patterns**

We begin our analysis of how frequently international organizations feature in national parliamentary debates by exploring some descriptive patterns of the phenomenon. For this purpose, we have compiled a unique new database, which is based on all parliamentary speeches in plenary between 1990 and 2018 in six national legislatures (the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Germany, New Zealand and Austria). <sup>1</sup> Using keyword search, this database contains almost 700,000 statements in parliamentary speeches that make references to at least one of the 75 most prominent international institutions (Hooghe et al. 2017).

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<sup>1</sup> More details about the IOParlSpeech dataset are provided in Section 4. The dataset also includes a few prominent international agreements such as NAFTA.

The *IOParlspeech* dataset shows that IOs are in fact mentioned frequently in parliamentary debates of Western Democracies. Over a period of 29 years, about 2% of all parliamentary communication makes reference to at least one international organization. At the same time, there is considerable variation across IOs, across countries and across time in the frequency with which IOs are mentioned in parliamentary speeches.


Figure1 shows which IOs feature most prominently in parliamentary speeches in each of the six national legislatures. For each country, it plots the share of all IO-related statements that mention one of the seven most frequently discussed IOs, as well as a combined category combining all other IOs. One striking finding is that only seven IOs dominate parliamentary discourse in all countries: the EU,(39% of all IO-related parliamentary communication), the UN (19%)<sup>2</sup>, NATO (10%), NAFTA (9%), WTO (6%), OECD (3%) and the IMF (2%). Together, these well-known IOs make up 86 per cent of all parliamentary communication on international institutions over the 1990-2018 period. This shows that a small number of IOs are responsible for the vast majority of debate on international cooperation in national parliaments. At the same time, there is a considerable number of international institutions that are hardly mentioned at all in parliamentary discourse.<sup>3</sup> Beyond the seven prominent IOs, none of the other IOs crosses the 1%-threshold, and 18 out of 75 IOs receive less than ten mentions in the entire sample. This variation resonates with existing studies on the contestation of IOs, which show that some IOs experience intense public criticism (Sommerer et al. 2022) or member state withdrawals (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019), but others do not.

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<sup>2</sup> The keyword searches are based on IOs in the MIA dataset (Hooghe et al. 2017), so the UN refers to the United Nations overall, whereas the sub-UN institutions (UNIDO, UNWTO, UNESCO etc.) have their own search terms – see Table A1 in the Appendix.

<sup>3</sup> For more details on the frequency with which each IO is mentioned in each parliament, see Table A2.

**Figure 1. Number of IO statements in National Parliamentary Debates, by legislature and international organization (1990 – 2018)**




Moreover, the relative salience of individual IOs (measured in term of frequency of mentions) varies considerably across legislatures. Whereas the EU is the number one IO discussed in all European countries (Austria, Germany and UK), the UN takes up a bigger share of speeches in the non-European countries (Canada, New Zealand, USA). Moreover, NAFTA is a highly salient international institution in the US and Canada.

Figure 2 provides further evidence for this country-level variation, and also documents considerable variation across time. It plots the frequency with which legislators speak about individual IOs in each of the six parliaments over time, relative to all parliamentary speeches in a given legislature and year. Figure 2 illustrates that the prevalence of international institutions in parliamentary speeches varies not just across IOs and across countries, but also and over time: in New Zealand, for instance, no IO makes up a significant share of parliamentary communication; speeches referring to an individual IO never exceed 2 per cent of yearly parliamentary communication. By contrast, there are significant peaks in mentions in other legislatures, typically related to certain events<sup>4</sup>. In Canada and the US for example, speeches referencing NAFTA made up over 10 per cent of *all* parliamentary communication in

1993, the year in which the agreement was ratified. Similarly, after the Brexit referendum, the share of speeches held in the British House of Commons in 2017 that referenced the EU increased sharply to over ten per cent of all parliamentary speeches.

**Figure 2. Share of parliamentary communication by year mentioning the seven most prominent IOs**



*Note: The blue line indicates the IO with the highest peak in mentions. IOs shown are the EU, UN, NATO, NAFTA, WTO, OECD, and the IMF.*

Finally, Figure 2 also points to another interesting trend. Contrary to arguments that international organizations have become increasingly politicized since the 1980s (Börzel and Zürn 2021; Zürn, Binder, and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012; Hooghe and Marks 2009; De Vries, Hobolt, and Walter 2021; Walter 2021), the overall pattern of IO salience in parliaments is rather flat, interspersed with brief periods of high IO salience surrounding specific IOs and specific events. Even EU-related speeches do not significantly increase over time in all European parliaments. Rather, the trend is stable in Austria, increases and then stabilizes in the mid-2000s in Germany, and increases first slowly and then, after 2016, sharply in the UK. Our analysis of parliamentary

discourse thus echoes quantitative studies of media discourse on international organizations that also finds that IO contestation has not significantly increased since the millennium (Schmidtke 2019; Sommerer et al. 2022).

### **3. International organizations in parliamentary debate: Theoretical Expectations**

The empirical patterns presented in the previous section show that some IOs are much more likely to be debated in national legislatures, that these the intensity of debate varies over time, and that these patterns vary across legislatures. To explain these patterns, we draw on research about the politicization of international organizations, discussions about a potential democratic deficit of IOs, and domestic politics in international relations more generally to develop several theoretical expectations about a) why some IOs are so much more salient than others, b) when IOs are discussed in national parliaments, and c) why some legislatures debate IOs much more frequently than others.

#### **3.1 Which IOs feature in national parliamentary debates?**

How can we explain that some IOs are discussed in national parliaments much more frequently than others? We explore three types of IO characteristics that could influence the likelihood that an IO is discussed in parliament: the level of authority the IO commands, its purpose, and whether the IO has institutional access points for national parliamentarians.

**IO Authority.** Recent scholarship has highlighted that the authority that IOs exercise varies considerably (Hooghe et al. 2017; Zürn, Tokhi, and Binder 2021) and argues that authority increases the contestation of international institutions (Rixen and Zangl 2013; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Mearsheimer 2019; Kreuder-Sonnen and Rittberger 2023) (see Zürn 2018, Zürn and Ecker-Erhardt 2012). Exercising authority requires legitimation, and this need to legitimize IO authority leads to debates, contestation, and sometimes resistance regarding the role IOs should play in international and domestic politics (Rixen and Zangl 2013; Schmidtke 2019; Rauh and Zürn 2020). In contrast, IOs with lower levels of authority do not



require legitimization to the same degree, so that they are less likely to be drawn into such debates (Schmidtke 2019). As prime venues of political contestation, this effect should also play out in national legislatures. Indeed, legislative debates are some of the most illustrative examples of how the increased authority of IOs leads to arguments about their legitimacy (or lack thereof). For instance, Sternberg (2013) shows that treaties expanding the competencies of the EU were accompanied by fierce parliamentary debates about encroachments on national sovereignty and attempts by governments to legitimize further integration. A second reason why IOs with high levels of authority might be more likely to be debated in parliament is more procedural: policies made by IOs have to go through the relevant domestic policy making channels. UN conventions, commitments to fight climate change, or agreements on regulatory harmonization must all be incorporated into domestic law, and these changes often need to pass a vote in the national parliament. As a result, high-authority IOs that produce binding policies are more likely to be mentioned in these more technical discussions taking place in parliament. We therefore expect *IOs with high levels of authority to be discussed more frequently in parliament*.

Taking a closer look at authority, however, qualifies this view a bit. The authority of an IO can originate both in the delegation and the pooling of authority – or both (Lake 2007) Hooghe et al. 2017). Delegation means that an IO commands “contingent authority to perform certain limited tasks” (Lake 2007, 220). over which member states typically retain the final say. In contrast, pooling implies that member states transfer the authority to make binding decisions to the IO and thus give up a degree of control over these decisions, as it becomes possible that individual member states are outvoted<sup>5</sup>. This suggests that national parliaments take fewer specific policy decisions related to IOs with pooled authority. We therefore expect *IOs with pooled authority to be discussed less frequently in national parliamentary debates* (even though the legitimacy of the IO more generally might still be debated). In contrast, *IOs with high levels of delegated authority should feature more prominently in parliamentary debates*, as they are more likely to take decisions that need to be ratified or transposed by national legislatures.

**IO Purpose.** IOs vary considerably with regard to the specificity and flexibility of their purpose (Hooghe et al. 2017; Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019). *General purpose* IOs have a contractually

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<sup>5</sup> This suggests that IOs that command high levels of both types of authority should be most heavily debated.

open-ended and flexible purpose and tend to cover broad policy portfolios. In contrast, the latter type of IOs, so-called *task-specific IOs*, have clearly-specified purposes. They also tend to have narrow policy portfolios. These institutional features are likely to create *more incentives and opportunities for national parliamentarians to discuss general purpose IOs than task-specific IOs*. First, their broader policy reach increases their potential for appearing in debates on a wider range of issues. For instance, the UN may be drawn into debates on gender equality, climate change, international humanitarian law, intellectual property, or food security (among many others); whereas a task-specific IO such as will only be drawn into debates concerning its direct remit. Furthermore, general purpose IOs are also more likely to be debated because of what they represent. IOs with broad policy portfolios are the closest approximation in the international domain to a government, exercising authority across a wide, incompletely contracted policy portfolio. Moreover, the incomplete contracting of general purpose IOs leaves them open to entrepreneurship by supranational bureaucrats (see Moravcsik 1999, Nay 2011), which national legislatures concerned about encroachments to their sovereignty would be particularly sensitive to. Finally, all these reasons make general purpose IOs particularly attractive discussion objects for political entrepreneurs who politicize international cooperation (De Vries and Hobolt 2020; De Vries, Hobolt, and Walter 2021), which is why their share in parliamentary debate overall should be higher than that of task-specific IOs.

**International Parliamentary Institutions.** In recent years, an increasing number of IOs have been equipped with international parliamentary institutions, which usually provide a direct link between national parliaments and an IO (Šabič 2008). International parliamentary institutions are collegial transnational bodies, whose members are usually delegated by national parliaments from their ranks (Rocabert et al. 2019).<sup>6</sup> They allow national parliamentarians information about the positions of other member states (as well as their own government) and the IO bureaucracy itself, as well as first-hand access to the IO's policymaking process. Moreover, participation in these institutions allows national parliamentarians to articulate and discuss their constituent's preferences and concerns on the supranational level (Malang 2019) enhance their control function (Lipps 2021), even if these bodies are usually consultative only. Given the access to information and representation opportunities that international parliamentary institutions

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<sup>6</sup> In rare cases, delegated are directly elected by citizens, such as in the European Parliament.

provide to national parliamentarians, we expect that *IOs which feature such institutions tend to be more prominent in national parliamentary debates than IOs which do not.*

### 3.2 When are IOs discussed in national parliamentary debates?

Why does debate of individual IOs in national parliaments vary across time? We argue that these temporal patterns are shaped by three factors. One – ratification period – is a time-varying features of individual IOs, one – international crises – relates to the international environment and the final one – national elections – focus on domestic-level incentives to speak (or not speak) about IOs.

**Ratification period:** In most democracies, treaties must be approved by the national legislature before they can formally enter into force and bind the country in question. While there are exceptions,<sup>7</sup> ratification constitutes one of the most important tasks national parliaments have with regard to international organizations: With the decision to join an IO or not, legislatures decide to transfer some national sovereignty (and by implication, of their own institutional authority) to the supranational level (Lehmann 2023), and this generates a need to legitimize this decision (Tallberg and Zürn 2019). For example, the ratification of European treaties has emerged as one of the strongest predictors of EU salience in quantitative analyses of national legislative debate (Rauh 2015, Rauh and De Wilde 2018, Lehmann 2023). Given the importance of the ratification decision, we expect this pattern to hold across IOs more broadly, and thus hypothesize that *an IO will be prominently discussed in the year in which parliament is ratifying their country's membership in the IO in question.*

**International crises:** Both the need for action by international organization and their contestation and politicization increase in times of international crisis (Schmidtke 2019). For example, individual IOs such as ASEAN or the IMF during the Asian Financial Crisis, NATO after 9/11, or the WHO during the COVID pandemic became heated topics of debate in the wake of these crises (Sommerer et al. 2022). Likewise, major crises, such as the euro or the refugee crisis, have increased the politicization of the EU (e.g. Hutter and Kriesi, 2019). We expect similar patterns to hold for parliamentary debate on international organizations and

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<sup>7</sup> In Australia for example, the government may legally enter into a binding treaty without seeking parliamentary approval (though most treaties are tabled in parliament).

hypothesize that international crises will increase parliamentary debate about IOs that are relevant for the respective crisis. In particular, we expect that international economic crises will increase the salience of IOs in the economic policy domain such as the IMF or the World Bank, whereas security crises will increase the frequency of mentioning politically oriented IOs, such as the UN, the OSCE, or NATO.

**National election years.** Legislators respond to election cycles by varying the types of issues they stress in their parliamentary speeches (Quinn et al. 2010; Lindstädt, Slapin, and Vander Wielen 2011). Because international cooperation can be a divisive issue especially for mainstream parties (De Vries and Hobolt 2020), speaking about this issue can be risky for parties, especially during election campaigns. As a result, during election campaigns mainstream parties in particular are more likely to emphasize issues like unemployment and immigration in their parliamentary communication, without linking these issues to international cooperation. Several analyses of EU salience in parliamentary debates find evidence for such a ‘crowding-out’ effect during election cycles (Rauh and De Wilde 2018, Winzen et al 2018, Lehmann 2023). We expect this pattern to hold for international organizations more broadly, possibly even more strongly as IOs generally are less integrated into domestic politics than the EU is in the politics of its member states. We thus expect the *salience of IOs to decrease during election years*.

### 3.3 Which legislatures talk more about IOs?

Finally, we also explore why some legislatures debate international organizations more frequently than others.<sup>8</sup> We focus whether the country is an IO member, the presence of challenger parties which mobilize voters along on the second dimension of party competition, and a country’s national economic context

**IO Membership.** An important driver of whether legislators are likely to speak about an IO is, whether their country is a *member* of this IO or not. Being a member of an IO also means parliament has transpose and implement international policy generated by the IO into domestic law (Claussen 1999, von Stein 2008), and this generates a need to debate these IO-related policies.

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<sup>8</sup> Empirically, our analysis will be limited by the fact that we only examine six countries. Our discussion therefore prioritizes legislature-level differences that vary across time or across IOs.

Moreover, decisions made by IOs usually directly affect their member states members directly, often in important and decisive ways (Hooghe and Marks 2009, Tokhis 2019), which again increases the likelihood that they will be discussed in the national parliament. Of course, IO membership is not a precondition for such discussions. After all, IOs can also have important ramifications for non-member states. Examples include the role of OPEC during the 1970s oil shock for European countries, the prominence of NATO in current Russian domestic discourse, or the relatively frequent mentions of the EU in Canadian and US American parliamentary discourse found in Figure 1. Nonetheless, we expect that on average, *IO membership increases the frequency with which IOs are mentioned in parliamentary debates.*

**Challenger Party Representation.** National legislatures vary considerably in how well so-called 'niche' or 'challenger' parties from more radical party families with limited government experience – such as the radical right, the radical left, or the green movement – are represented (Adams et al 2006, Meguid 2005, De Vries and Hobolt 2020). Although scholars differ on how exactly they conceptualize challenger parties, they all agree that these parties have strong incentives to mobilize issues that can disturb the political equilibrium (Riker et al 1986), especially issues which are not easily subsumed into the dominant left-right (economic) dimension of party competition that has dominated party competition in Western democracies (Kriesi 2016). Rather, these parties have incentives to mobilize issues that fall on the second dimension of political contestation. International cooperation is such an issue (De Vries et al 2021): Mainstream parties on the center-right tend to favor market integration but oppose the transfer of authority to supranational actors. Parties on the center-left tend to oppose the economic (neo) liberalism that characterizes IOs' economic policy, but welcome international cooperation on a wide range of ecological and humanitarian issues. Because taking a stance on these issues can drive a wedge into the electorates of more centrist mainstream parties, challenger parties have strong incentives to emphasize these issues (De Vries and Hobolt 2020). This is true of challenger parties on both extremes. Radical right parties highlight the IO issue to mobilize discontent toward supranational elites and highlight encroachments to national sovereignty. Challenger parties with more cosmopolitan tendencies like the greens might emphasize IO-related topics to highlight their centrality in solving global issues like climate change. Representation in parliament gives these parties the opportunity to call attention to these

topics, including in emphasizing IO-related issues in the parliamentary speeches held by their representatives. Mainstream parties, in contrast, often have incentives downplay issues related to international cooperation (Raunio 2014). We therefore expect that *IOs are discussed more prominently in legislatures in which challenger parties hold a larger share of parliamentary seats.*

**National Economic Context.** Finally, the national economic context facing a legislature could also have an influence on the salience of IOs in parliament. In particular, when countries face difficult economic times, politicians face deep pressure to respond as economic factors such as growth, inflation and unemployment have been shown to impact on the popularity of incumbents and the risk of them being voted out of office (Bingham and Whitten 1993). On the one hand, this could increase the salience of IOs, whose collaborative efforts can be a solution to domestic economic problems (Aggarwal and Dupont 2005). IOs can even be used as scapegoats for difficult economic times (Vreeland 1999, Heinkelmann-Wild and Zangl 2020). Yet history suggest that national politicians also have a tendency to retreat inwards rather than engage outwards when faced with domestic economic crises (Naoi 2020). Additionally, as discussed above, international cooperation is an issue that fits more clearly on the second dimension of political contestation, and as the left-right economic dimension dominates during tough economic times, it is harder for IOs to ‘fit’ onto the dimension of political debate. Whilst it is therefore possible that difficult national economic contexts could increase the salience of certain IOs, we expect that overall, the ‘retreat inwards’ effect will dominate and thus expect *IOs to be less salient in legislatures facing a difficult national economic context.*

#### **4. Introducing IOParlSpeech: A New Dataset of IO statements in parliamentary debates**

To explore the salience of international organizations in domestic parliamentary speech, we introduce and use the *IOParlspeech* dataset, a new and unique dataset containing all statements in parliamentary speeches from six Western national legislatures between 1990 and 2018 that

refer to at least one of the 75 most prominent IOs.<sup>9</sup> The dataset includes 658,938 statements made about these IOs in the US Congress, the British House of Commons, New Zealand’s House of Commons, the German Bundestag, Austria’s National Rat, and Canada’s House of Commons.<sup>10</sup> Although our case selection is constrained by data availability and feasibility concerns, it reflects a set of geographically diverse countries (the sample spans three continents), that includes both powerful and less powerful countries in the international system (e.g. USA and New Zealand), which vary considerably in their level of economic and political globalization (Gygli et al. 2019).<sup>11</sup>

The 75 international organizations included in *IOParlspeech* are drawn from the Measure of International Authority Database (Hooghe et al 2017)<sup>12</sup>. The dataset includes both global IOs (e.g. United Nations) and regional IOs (e.g. African Union), defined as “formal organizations for collective decision making among at least *three* member states” (Hooghe et al 2017: 14-15) that have a distinct physical location or website, a formal structure, at least thirty permanent staff, a written constitution or convention, and a decision body that meets at least once a year.<sup>13</sup> It covers IOs from a wide range of policy areas from finance (e.g. the IMF), to energy (e.g. the European Organization for Nuclear Research) to agriculture (e.g. Centre for Agriculture) to the marine environment (e.g. International Seabed Authority). Table A1 in the online appendix gives an overview over the 75 IOs included the dataset and our analysis.

*IOParlspeech* contains “IO statements” as observations, that is statements that make reference to one or more IOs. We focus on individual statements rather than full speeches because we want to capture parliamentary communication about IOs as precisely as possible: if a long speech mentions just one IO in passing, this has a different quality that repeatedly engages with

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<sup>9</sup> The full dataset will be made public in addition to the replication material for this article upon publication of this manuscript.

<sup>10</sup> For Austria, the data starts in 1996.

<sup>11</sup> Whilst a growing text-as-data literature is making an increasing number of parliamentary transcripts available in machine readable format (Rauh, C., & Schwalbach, J. 2020; Greene et al 2023), these are largely limited to Western parliamentary democracies

<sup>12</sup> <https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/data/international-authority/>

<sup>13</sup> For some of the IOs included (such as NAFTA), one could debate whether the institution is really an international organization. However, for consistency reasons we follow the case selection of the MIA dataset and include all institutions covered by this dataset. Because our period of study begins only in 1990, we combine the observations for the East African Community (EAC1 from 1967 to 1976 and EAC2 from 1993 onwards), which are coded as two separate observations in the MIA dataset. *IOParlspeech* thus includes 75 IOs, whereas the MIA database includes 76 IOs.

one or more IOs.<sup>14</sup> A focus on individual statements thus allows us to better proxy the *salience* of IOs in parliamentary speech. The IO statements we identify are three sentences in length, capturing both the sentence where the IO is mentioned, and the sentence before and after for additional context. Table 1 gives three examples of typical IO statements: an MP from New Zealand criticizing the allowances paid to peacekeeping forces, a British MP criticizing French dominance of the IMF, and a US Congressman lauding the benefits of NAFTA.

**Table 1: Exemplary Statements in IOParlspeech**

<i>Date</i>	<i>Speaker</i>	<i>IO</i>	<i>IO Statement</i>
1994/09	G. Braybrooke (NZ - Labour)	UN	They found that compared with other United Nations peacekeeping forces they were grossly underpaid. The allowances paid to our peacekeeping forces were described as a pittance compared with those paid to other United Nations peacekeeping forces. They also discovered other things, which our troops will also discover when they get to Bosnia.
2014/02	J. Rees-Mogg (UK - Cons)	IMF	The IMF is not full of well-known leftists, but it does seem to be run, by and large, by the French, who have a very different understanding of economics, an absolutely rotten economy, and are the last people from whom I would take lessons. We will not in this Chamber go into the behaviour of the previous managing director it would shock the viewers of the Parliament channel if they were to consider how Monsieur Strauss-Kahn had behaved.
1991/06	T. Kennedy (USA - Dem)	NAFTA	A North American free trade agreement would mean a combined market of more than 360 million people with a combined GNP of more than \$ 5, 9 trillion. Total trade between the three nations amounts to more than \$ 225 billion, and would certainly grow significantly with a North American free trade agreement Mr Speaker, I could go on, but clearly these figures alone demonstrate an unparalleled opportunity for economic cooperation in North America.

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<sup>14</sup> This data collection method means that one speech might contain several IO statements. Note that in the IOParlspeech dataset, scholars have the option to view the full speech from which the IO statement is taken if they require additional context.



To identify IO statements, we use search strings, and include both the IO's full name (e.g., 'International Monetary Fund') and the IO's acronym in the parliament's native language (e.g., 'IMF').<sup>15</sup> Acronyms are crucial to identify statements about IOs, yet some could yield false positives. To guard against this risk, we gave handcoders a random sample of five hits from each acronym search string for each parliament. If any of these random samples returned one or more false positives, hand coders were asked to hand code all statements containing the acronym in the full sample. There is also a risk of false negatives for IOParlspeech, because parliamentarians might reference an IO by alluding to its policies or institutions, but without mentioning the IO's name directly. To show that false negatives are not debilitating for IOParlspeech, we take the case where false negatives seem most likely, the EU. The EU not only has considerable policy output, but crucially also has the advantage of having validated dictionaries of a range of policy, institutional, and polity-related EU terms (De Wilde and Rauh 2018). We identify all EU-related parliamentary statements based on these dictionaries and compare them to all EU-related statements included in IOParlspeech. We find that in all six parliaments, the majority of EU-related communication is captured by IOParlspeech statements that reference either the 'European Union' or the 'EU'. Section 2 in the online appendix contains further details on our validation method to minimize false positives and false negatives in our analysis.

Table 2 provides an overview of the data on IO statements contained in the IOParlspeech corpus by parliament. It reveals substantial variation not just in the number of statements, but also in the breadth of IO coverage in parliamentary speech. For example, whereas almost all of the 75 IOs in our dataset are discussed at least once in the US Congress, less than two thirds of all IOs are discussed by parliaments in Austria, New Zealand, and the UK. This shows that a relatively large number of IOs do not undergo a lot of (or even any) parliamentary scrutiny during the investigation period. Table A2 in the online appendix provides a more detailed overview about how frequently each IO is mentioned in each parliament in our dataset.

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<sup>15</sup> Our search strings are language specific and in English include both American and British spellings (e.g., 'organization' and 'organisation').

**Table 2. IO statements included in IOParlspeech (1990 – 2018)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Parliament</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Number of IO Statements</i>	<i>IOs mentioned</i>	<i>Top-Five mentioned Ios</i>
Austria	Nationalrat	1996-2018	42,528	45 IOs	EU, NATO, OECD, UN, OSCE
Canada	House of Commons	1990-2018	106,077	64 IOs	UN, NAFTA, WTO, OECD, OAS
Germany	Bundestag	1990-2018	77,026	60 IOs	EU, NATO, UN, OECD, WTO
New Zealand	House of Representatives	1990-2018	28,413	49 IOs	UN, OECD, WTO, EU, ASEAN
United Kingdom	House of Commons	1990-2018	28,413	49 IOs	UN, OECD, NATO, WTO, IMF
United States of America	Congress	1990-2018	143,566	71 IOs	NAFTA, UN, NATO, WTO, EU

Overall, IOParlspeech dataset provides a versatile data source to study how international organizations are discussed in national parliaments. Its statement-level structure allows for a detailed investigation of IO-related parliamentary discourse regarding IO type, types of speakers, timing, and tone, but also allows for more aggregated-level analyses. As the analysis presented in this paper demonstrates, for example, these data can be used to build a time-series dataset of the salience of different IOs in the national parliamentary debates of a wide range of countries across 28 years. By making the dataset publicly available, we therefore hope to spur new insights into the linkages between domestic democratic politics and international organizations

## 5. Research Design

### 5.1 Dependent Variable: Salience of international organizations in parliamentary speech

The dependent variable in this study is the salience of individual IOs in parliamentary debates across countries and across time. We therefore use *IOParlSpeech* to build a panel dataset with the IO-country-year as unit of analysis. Each of the 12,049 observations thus captures the yearly number of statements about each IO, in each parliament, in each year. This figure ranges from 0 (many IOs do not receive a mention in a given year) to 20,726 for NAFTA in the US Congress in 1993. This dependent variable is skewed, and we therefore use a multilevel, mixed effect, negative binomial model to test our hypotheses. (see section 5.3 for details on model selection and tables A7 and A8 for the summary statistics of dependent and independent variables in the model).

### 5.2 Independent Variables

The hypotheses developed above suggest that the salience of international organization in national parliamentary debate should be shaped by factors that vary across IOs, across time, and across legislatures. We operationalize these factors as follows:

#### *IO characteristics: IO authority, IO purpose, and international parliamentary institutions*

Our first set of hypotheses explore which IOs feature in parliamentary debate and focuses on three key characteristics of international organizations: IO authority, IO purpose, and the presence of international parliamentary institution. We use the MIA dataset to construct our authority variable. We create a measure of *overall authority* by creating an average of pooled and delegated authority. We also test for the effects of delegation and pooling separately. Measures of pooling and delegation are coded from 0 (no delegated/pooled authority) to 1 (full delegated/ pooled authority). The measures of pooling range from 0.007 to 0.689 (mean of 0.309) and the measures of delegation from 0 to 0.652 (mean of 0.214). Because IOs with high levels of both pooled and delegated authority interfere most with national sovereignty and are thus most likely to require legitimation, we also estimate a model that includes an interaction term between pooled and delegated authority.

To distinguish between general and task-specific IOs, we again use the MIA dataset which includes details on an IO's contract specificity. We generate a dummy variable for "general purpose IOs", which takes the value of 1, if IOs that bundle the provision of multiple public goods rather than contracting cooperation narrowly around specified cooperation problems. 39.9% of IOs in our sample are general purpose IOs. Finally, we include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an IO is equipped with an *international parliamentary institution* (IPI) based on information from the IPI dataset (Schimmelfennig et al. 2020). In total, 26 of the 75 IOs in IOParlspeech contained an IPI for at least part of the investigation period.

#### *Time-varying variables: ratification periods, international crises, and national elections*

Our second set of hypotheses set out expectations about *when* IOs are discussed in parliament. To code *ratification years*, we first identify those IOs that were created during the investigation period using the IO's inception year from the MIA dataset. Altogether, we identified seven IOs from the MIA dataset that were ratified during the investigation period: NAFTA, the European Economic Area (EEA), the EU, the ICC, the WTO, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the International Seabed Authority (ISA)<sup>16</sup>. We then searched government sources of the respective countries for the year in which membership in each IO was ratified in each respective country. Ratification years for six IOs cluster in the early 1990s, and membership the ICC was ratified in 2000 (DE, AT, CAN, NZ) and 2001 (UK).<sup>17</sup> To identify *international economic crises*, we use the database on systemic banking crises from Laeven and Valencia (2018) and capture the aggregate number of banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises taking place each year. This variable ranges between 28 economic crises taking place in 2008 to none (0) taking place in 2006. We code the extent of international *security crises* with the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Davies et al 2023). We capture the number of wars (conflict intensity of 2 on the UCDP data) taking place each year. This variable ranges from 4 wars taking place (in the years 2007 and 2010), to 14 wars taking place (in the years 1990 and 1992). To explore the interaction between crisis type and IO type, we also code an IO's issue area based on the COW's Intergovernmental

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<sup>16</sup> Note that for the IOs that were ratified during the investigation period, we include panel data for the five years preceding inception, because we expect these IOs to have been discussed in the negotiation phase leading up to the IOs creation. The values for an IO's authority, delegation, pooling, purpose and issue area during these pre-inception years are imputed based on values for their first year of existence.

<sup>17</sup> Table A5 in the Appendix contains details on the ratification year for each relevant parliament.

Organization dataset (Pevehouse et al 2020), which distinguishes between political, economic, and social IOs. Finally, we include a dummy variable for each year in which legislative elections were held in each of our countries. The data come from the ParlGov dataset (Doring et al 2022).

*Country & Legislature characteristics: IO membership, challenger parties, and national economic context*

Our third set of hypotheses explore which legislatures debate IOs the most. To capture whether a country is a member of an IO in a given year, we use the information on yearly membership for all the IOs in our sample from the COW IGO dataset (Pevehouse et al 2020). To capture the *share of challenger parties* in parliament, we follow Hobolt and De Vries (2020), who conceptualize challengers as parties without government experience- We then use the ParlGov dataset (Doring et al 2022) to compute the share of parliamentary seats held by challenger parties in a given legislature relative to all seats. Finally, we operationalize a country's national economic context through its yearly rate of unemployment, a particularly salient economic indicator which has been shown to influence government popularity and vote choice (Bingham and Whitten 1993).

### **5.3 Model Selection**

Our dependent variable is skewed: many IOs are simply not discussed in a given year, and some receive high numbers of mentions. We therefore use a multilevel negative binomial with random effects for IOs and years, and fixed effects for countries. We first run models with the full sample with country fixed effects (see Table 3). We then run these models separately, excluding the interactions, for each of the six countries in our sample (see Table 4).

The regressions for our full sample include seven models. Our first model uses the overall measure of IO authority, an average of pooling and delegation. Our second model differentiates between delegation and pooling, as coded in the MIA dataset. Our third model includes the interaction between delegation and pooling. Our fourth and fifth models include the interaction between international economic and international security crises and IO issue area. Likewise, our sixth and seventh model include the interactions between the seat share of challenger

parties and authority using the overall measure of authority (Model 6) and the distinction between pooling and delegation (Model 7).

The full models for each country separately are presented in Table 4. Note that the regression for the US does not include any coefficients for the challenger share, as the American two-party system has (so far) made it impossible for any challenger parties to break through<sup>18</sup>. Finally, we also include a number of robustness checks in the Appendix: models ran with an alternate measure of IO Authority (the MIA database from Zurn et al 2018) on the subset of our data where this measure is available (Table A9), and models with the top 1% of observations removed (Table A10).

## 6. Results

Table 3 presents the results of our models. These show that many of the hypotheses developed in the theoretical section are corroborated by the data. In terms of IO characteristics, IOs with higher levels of authority are more likely to be debated in parliament. Interestingly though, results from model 2 show that whilst the overall effect of authority on IO salience is positive and significant the effects for pooling and delegation do not quite work as hypothesized. In Model 2 and 5, it is in fact pooled authority that has an effect on the number of parliamentary mentions of an IO. And in particular, it is the interaction between pooled and delegate authority that has a large effect: it seems it is the combination of both that makes an IO particularly salient in parliamentary debates (see Model 3).

Other effects of IGO characteristics are consistent across all model specifications. General Purpose IOs are mentioned more often in parliamentary debates than task specific IOs. Additionally, IOs with an International Parliamentary Institution are also mentioned more frequently than those without. This is somewhat positive from an accountability standpoint, and suggest the attempts to link national parliamentarians with international legislatures (see Schimmelfenig et al 2020) may be bearing fruit.

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<sup>18</sup> Our analysis does not consider independents as belonging to a challenger party

In terms of variation across time, the models show how ratification years have a significant effect on the salience of an IO: the decision to join an IO is accompanied by parliamentary debate, in some case very salient parliamentary debate as shown in the peaks of NAFTA salience in Figure 1. The hypothesis that IOs become less salient during election years, when domestic issues crowd out international ones, is also corroborated in our models. The effect of systemic crises, though seem less pronounced. The coefficients both of international crises and its interaction with IOs' issue areas are insignificant except for the interaction of security crises and political IOs in Model 5. On the whole, we find limited evidence that international crises shape the extent to which IOs are debated in legislatures domestically.

Finally, country, or legislature level characteristics impact on the level of salience of an IO. Membership has unsurprisingly a clear positive effect on the amount an IO is discussed in parliament. High levels of unemployment though, do not. One potential explanation is that the effects hypothesized in our theory work in both ways: that a tough national economic context provides both incentives to reach out to international economic IOs to help, and to retreat inwards, effects that even themselves out in the aggregate. Finally, the interactions between authority and challenger share in Model 6 and 7 are worth commenting upon. The interaction suggests that higher share of challenger party seat share actually reduces discussion of high-authority IOs. This is an interesting and potentially counterintuitive finding that suggests that there might to be some strategizing by the other parties going on. One hypothesis might be that mainstream parties seek to downplaying the importance of authoritative IOs when challenger parties are strong, displaying in this case the strategy of 'avoidance' which has been central to their historical success (De Vries and Hobolt 2020).

**Table 3: Multilevel mixed-effect negative binomial regression results**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
IO authority (overall)	3.191*** (0.940)			3.346*** (0.944)		3.448*** (0.952)	
IO delegation		-0.025 (0.675)	-2.957*** (1.101)		0.042 (0.675)		-0.260 (0.689)
IO pooling		4.553*** (0.997)	2.033 (1.246)		4.663*** (0.999)		4.812*** (0.999)
IO delegation* IO pooling			12.061*** (3.597)				
IO auth * challengershare						-2.346* (1.366)	
IO del * challengershare							1.432 (1.148)
IO pool*challengershare							-2.864*** (0.896)
General Purpose	1.282** (0.539)	1.448** (0.571)	1.605*** (0.566)	1.279** (0.540)	1.450** (0.573)	1.274** (0.539)	1.438** (0.570)
IPI Dummy	1.033*** (0.186)	1.066*** (0.187)	0.986*** (0.187)	1.023*** (0.186)	1.055*** (0.186)	1.023*** (0.186)	1.066*** (0.186)
Ratification Year	1.495*** (0.428)	1.500*** (0.426)	1.503*** (0.423)	1.489*** (0.428)	1.492*** (0.426)	1.502*** (0.427)	1.503*** (0.424)
Intl. economic crises	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
Intl. security crises	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.012)
Economic IO	0.149 (0.796)	0.597 (0.836)	0.557 (0.842)	0.155 (0.800)	0.601 (0.840)	0.147 (0.796)	0.579 (0.834)
Political IO	0.904 (0.918)	1.261 (0.957)	1.092 (0.965)	0.640 (0.933)	0.988 (0.972)	0.905 (0.917)	1.245 (0.955)
Economic crisis * economic IO				0.001 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)		
Security crisis * political IO				0.033 (0.020)	0.034* (0.020)		
Legislative elections	-0.374*** (0.044)	-0.373*** (0.044)	-0.372*** (0.044)	-0.373*** (0.044)	-0.372*** (0.044)	-0.373*** (0.044)	-0.373*** (0.044)
IO member	3.068*** (0.077)	3.064*** (0.077)	3.064*** (0.077)	3.068*** (0.077)	3.064*** (0.077)	3.059*** (0.077)	3.065*** (0.077)
Challenger seat share	0.557 (0.439)	0.567 (0.438)	0.600 (0.438)	0.563 (0.439)	0.572 (0.438)	1.229** (0.588)	1.184** (0.588)
Unemployment	-0.023 (0.019)	-0.023 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.023 (0.019)	-0.023 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.023 (0.019)



Constant	-9.298*** (1.111)	-10.435*** (1.202)	-10.034*** (1.202)	-9.252*** (1.114)	-10.399*** (1.205)	-9.334*** (1.111)	-10.444*** (1.199)
<i>Random effects</i>							
IO-level variance	7.135*** (1.202)	7.709*** (1.307)	7.811*** (1.329)	7.136*** (1.203)	7.729*** (1.312)	7.122*** (1.199)	7.664*** (1.299)
Year-level variance	0.648*** (0.047)	0.638*** (0.046)	0.629*** (0.046)	0.643*** (0.047)	0.633*** (0.046)	0.650*** (0.047)	0.637*** (0.046)
Log Pseudo~d	-24018	-24013	-24007	-24017	-24011	-24017	-24007
bic	48347	48345	48344	48363	48361	48353	48353
Observations	12049	12049	12049	12049	12049	12049	12049

To further check the robustness of our findings we also include the regressions separately for each country in our panel (see Table 4 below). The results are largely robust – particularly those surrounding IPIs, membership, and legislative elections. Note though that the effect of authority is different for different countries and in fact negative in the case of Austria. It is significantly positive though for Germany, the UK, and the USA. Note also how the US Congress is particularly likely to discuss IOs during systemic economic crises, given its leading role in the international economic and financial system. More generally, the salience of economic and political (compared to social) IOs is significantly higher in the US compared to other countries. Overall, though, the results are rather robust across countries, with some interesting country specificities that scholars could delve into in further detail using IOParlspeech (see the conclusion for a discussion of promising further avenues of research). In the Appendix, we include in Tables A9 and A10 robustness checks including an alternate measure of authority from the IAD database (Zurn et al 2018) and from a sample that drops the top 1 % of observations to check that the effects are not driven by a handful of incredibly salient IO-country-years.

**Table 4: Country Analyses: Negative binomial panel regressions**

	Austria	Canada	Germany	New Zealand	UK	USA
IO authority	-3.713*** (1.160)	0.654 (0.479)	1.431** (0.634)	0.302 (0.574)	0.884* (0.466)	1.946*** (0.427)
General purpose IO	0.817*** (0.276)	0.289 (0.181)	0.404** (0.184)	1.108*** (0.215)	0.470*** (0.137)	-0.167 (0.149)
IPI dummy	0.553** (0.232)	0.581*** (0.142)	0.580*** (0.133)	0.355* (0.193)	0.413*** (0.099)	0.446*** (0.115)
Ratification year	0.659 (0.887)	2.053*** (0.262)	0.439 (0.355)	2.160*** (0.330)	-0.034 (0.365)	1.478*** (0.334)
Intl. economic crises	0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	0.016*** (0.005)
Intl. security crises	0.028* (0.017)	0.024* (0.014)	0.003 (0.015)	0.017 (0.020)	-0.030*** (0.011)	0.001 (0.017)
Economic IO	-0.430 (0.268)	0.116 (0.144)	-0.014 (0.172)	0.024 (0.189)	-0.202 (0.147)	0.354** (0.139)
Political IO	-0.704** (0.324)	-0.107 (0.166)	0.066 (0.191)	-0.003 (0.214)	-0.018 (0.162)	0.503*** (0.156)
Legislative elections	-0.241*** (0.092)	-0.269*** (0.070)	-0.307*** (0.079)	-0.169** (0.078)	-0.201*** (0.063)	-0.333*** (0.062)
IO member	2.075*** (0.291)	1.742*** (0.183)	1.351*** (0.181)	1.530*** (0.224)	1.158*** (0.142)	0.573*** (0.144)
Challenger seat share	-0.077 (0.973)	-0.038 (0.469)	1.153 (1.144)	0.115 (0.621)	2.364 (2.131)	. .
Unemployment	0.140* (0.082)	0.046 (0.036)	-0.017 (0.037)	-0.016 (0.032)	-0.004 (0.023)	-0.031 (0.025)
Year	-0.050 (0.047)	0.117*** (0.036)	0.058* (0.031)	0.066 (0.041)	-0.001 (0.022)	0.014 (0.029)
Year^2	0.001 (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Constant	-4.042*** (1.233)	-7.236*** (0.718)	-4.459*** (0.699)	-7.196*** (0.808)	-2.677*** (0.593)	-3.191*** (0.708)
Log Pseudo~d	-1773	-3895	-3362	-2504	-4950	-4180
bic	3648	7901	6834	5116	10012	8464
Observations	943	1721	1537	1361	1839	1647

## 7 Conclusion

Which international organizations (IOs) are debated in national parliaments, and which ones receive less attention? When are IOs discussed, and what explains differences across legislatures? These questions matter for democratic accountability in IOs and for understanding the intersection of domestic politics and IOs more broadly.

This article has aimed to address them using a new dataset of nearly 700,000 IO statements in six legislatures across the world. Our findings provide both good and bad news from an accountability perspective. On the plus side, the fact that the ratification of international agreements is accompanied by significant parliamentary debate suggests parliamentarians at the very least attempt scrutiny when authority is transferred to IOs. Additionally, parliamentarians do seem to be paying attention to the highly authoritative IOs whose policies are most likely to effect the lives of their constituents. The relationship between the presence of an international parliamentary institution (IPI) and the salience of that IO in national parliaments also suggests attempts to link domestic and international legislatures may be bearing fruit. Whilst all these conclusions warrant a heavy note of caution – none of the analyses presented here are causal – they at least present some initial plausibility for the hypotheses developed in the article.

Some findings are more worrisome for an accountability perspective. The fact that so many IOs receive little to no parliamentary attention suggests that there is ample room for ‘executive drift’ (Follesdal and Hix 2006) in these IOs. Moreover, the finding that election years diminish the salience of IOs suggests that they are unlikely to have a strong effect on voters’ decisions at the ballot box. This in turn reduces the extent to which voters can hold IOs and executives accountable. Whilst governments might have to ‘look over their shoulder’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 5) when making policy in IOs like the UN, the WTO, or the EU, this is unlikely to be the case for the longtail of IOs that receive little coverage and scrutiny in parliamentary debates.

A number of avenues for further research emerge from this initial presentation of *IOParlspeech*. The first is to expand country coverage, particularly to legislatures in the Global South. Whilst this initial case selection is constrained by the availability of machine-readable parliamentary transcripts, the growing text as data infrastructure for political science (see Rauh et al 2021, Green et al. 2023) makes us optimistic that a future in which we can quantitatively analyze how IOs are debated in, for instance, India's Lok Shaba or the National Congress of Brazil, is within reach. A second avenue could use *IOParlspeech* to venture beyond the salience of international institutions, into the *substance* of parliamentary communication on IOs. An exciting literature has explored legitimation and delegitimation narratives used on IOs (Schmidtke and Lenz 2023, Ecker-Erhardt 2018, Tallberg and Zurn 2019), as well as blame-shifting toward international institutions by national governments (Vreeland 1999, Heinkelmann-Wild and Zangl 2020). *IOParlspeech* could be used to analyze how, when, and why IOs are legitimized and delegitimized in the rhetoric of national politicians. A third avenue could investigate the *consequences* of rhetoric for the actions of IOs and the behaviour of member state governments. Scholars have argued that rhetoric surrounding international cooperation is not just 'cheap talk' and that governments can rhetorically entrap themselves, thereby pursuing certain policies because of public positions that become impossible to reverse (Elser 2017, Schimmelfennig 2001). How does rhetoric on IOs at the domestic level affect governments at the international level? Do IO bureaucrats take notice and respond to national debates on international cooperation? What is the relationship between the domestic debate and the policy output of international institutions? *IOParlspeech* can help scholars answer these questions in a world where domestic and international politics are increasingly intertwined.

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# Appendix

## 1 - IOs in IOParlspeech

The table below includes the full list of IOs in IOParlspeech. These are drawn from the Measuring International Authority Database (Hooghe and Marks 2017). The search strings include both the IO's acronym and the IO's full name. The languages are English for the USA, UK, Canada, and New Zealand, and German for Germany and Austria.

**Table A1 - List of IOs in IOParlspeech**

Acronym in English	Full name in English	COW issue area
ALADI	Latin American Integration Association	economic
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union	economic
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	economic
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	economic
AU	African Union	political
Benelux	Benelux	political
BIS	Bank for International Settlements	economic
CABI	Centre for Agriculture and Bioscience International	social
CAN	Andean Community	economic
Caricom	Caribbean Community	economic
CCNR	Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine	political
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa	economic
CERN	European Organization for Nuclear Research	economic
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	political
COE	Council of Europe	political
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance	economic
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	economic
ComSec	Commonwealth Secretariat	political
EAC2	East African Community	economic
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	economic
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	economic
EEA	European Economic Area	economic
EFTA	European Free Trade Agreement	economic
ESA	European Space Agency	political
EU	European Union	economic
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	economic
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council	economic
GEF	Global Environment Facility	social
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency	social

IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	economic
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization	social
ICC	International Criminal Court	political
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development	economic
ILO	International Labour Organization	social
IMF	International Monetary Fund	economic
IMO	International Maritime Organization	economic
Interpol	International Criminal Police Organization	social
IOM	International Organization for Migration	political
ISA	International Seabed Authority	social
ITU	International Telecommunication Union	economic
IWhale	International Whaling Commission	economic
LOAS	Arab League/League of Arab States	political
Mercosur	Southern Common Market	economic
NAFO	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization	social
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement	economic
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	political
NordC	Nordic Council	political
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries	economic
OAS	Organization of American States	political
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development	economic
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States	economic
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation	social
OIF	International Organisation of La Francophonie	social
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries	economic
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation In Europe	political
OTIF	Intergovernmental Organization for International Carriage by Rail	economic
PCA	Permanent Court of Arbitration	political
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum	political
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation	political
SACU	Southern African Customs Union	economic
SADC	Southern African Development Community	economic
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization	political
SELA	Latin American and the Caribbean Economic System	economic
SICA	Central American Integration System	economic
SPC	South Pacific Commission	political
UN	United Nations	political
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization	social
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization	economic
UNWTO	World Tourism Organization	economic
UPU	Universal Postal Union	economic
WCO	World Customs Organization	economic

WHO	World Health Organization	social
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization	economic
WMO	World Meteorological Organization	social
WTO	World Trade Organization	economic

**Table A2 – Number of Statements per IO**

	Austria		Germany		UK		Canada		USA		New Zealand		Full Sample	
IO name	Total	Share	Total	Share	Total	Share	Total	Share	Total	Share	Total	Share	Total	Share
EU	32,895	77%	44,661	58%	166,874	59%	7,355	7%	5,985	5%	1,420	5%	259,190	39%
UN	1,498	4%	3,349	4%	49,473	18%	32,611	32%	28,812	22%	8,083	31%	123,826	19%
NATO	2,476	6%	13,220	17%	20,692	7%	7,474	7%	21,802	17%	156	1%	65,820	10%
NAFTA	60	0%	142	0%	468	0%	24,792	24%	36,594	28%	36	0%	62,092	9%
WTO	462	1%	2,453	3%	7,810	3%	10,090	10%	14,311	11%	2,192	8%	37,318	6%
OECD	1,999	5%	2,492	3%	3,845	1%	4,684	5%	1,069	1%	6,796	26%	20,885	3%
IMF	401	1%	1,554	2%	5,067	2%	2,299	2%	4,044	3%	1,463	6%	14,828	2%
IBRD	169	0%	1,227	2%	3,418	1%	1,042	1%	2,172	2%	498	2%	8,526	1%
WHO	311	1%	890	1%	2,167	1%	0	0%	1,587	1%	461	2%	7,394	1%
COE	640	2%	719	1%	4,718	2%	339	0%	143	0%	19	0%	6,535	1%
OSCE	535	1%	2,250	3%	755	0%	401	0%	1,693	1%	0	0%	5,634	1%
ICC	27	0%	88	0%	2,049	1%	875	1%	811	1%	414	2%	4,264	1%
IAEA	26	0%	282	0%	1,184	0%	203	0%	2,519	2%	33	0%	4,247	1%
ILO	18	0%	94	0%	1,127	0%	431	0%	747	1%	1,069	4%	3,486	1%
UNESCO	236	1%	622	1%	930	0%	980	1%	459	0%	115	0%	3,342	1%
OPEC	47	0%	93	0%	147	0%	109	0%	2,864	2%	14	0%	3,274	0%
EEA	254	1%	68	0%	2,566	1%	0	0%	2	0%	1	0%	2,891	0%
APEC	1	0%	25	0%	7	0%	1,268	1%	59	0%	0	0%	2,852	0%
AU	3	0%	216	0%	1,105	0%	518	1%	430	0%	6	0%	2,278	0%
EFTA	27	0%	92	0%	1,243	0%	598	1%	8	0%	0	0%	1,968	0%
ASEAN	10	0%	192	0%	390	0%	95	0%	487	0%	572	2%	1,746	0%
NAFO	0	0%	2	0%	15	0%	1,572	2%	57	0%	3	0%	1,649	0%
LOAS	1	0%	51	0%	718	0%	142	0%	607	0%	12	0%	1,531	0%
ICAO	8	0%	53	0%	316	0%	339	0%	314	0%	101	0%	1,131	0%

IMO	0	0%	129	0%	500	0%	65	0%	256	0%	53	0%	998	0%
Interpol	59	0%	90	0%	439	0%	156	0%	197	0%	55	0%	996	0%
IWhale	6	0%	139	0%	330	0%	7	0%	345	0%	97	0%	924	0%
CIS	27	0%	489	1%	97	0%	13	0%	244	0%	3	0%	873	0%
OAS	0	0%	31	0%	20	0%	139	0%	683	1%	0	0%	873	0%
FAO	18	0%	265	0%	196	0%	138	0%	97	0%	35	0%	749	0%
ESA	45	0%	242	0%	179	0%	23	0%	98	0%	11	0%	598	0%
WIPO	5	0%	12	0%	15	0%	179	0%	311	0%	66	0%	588	0%
Caricom	0	0%	0	0%	118	0%	119	0%	282	0%	2	0%	521	0%
GEF	10	0%	58	0%	67	0%	15	0%	349	0%	1	0%	500	0%
SADC	4	0%	94	0%	329	0%	1	0%	18	0%	7	0%	453	0%
Mercosur	32	0%	127	0%	127	0%	75	0%	49	0%	6	0%	416	0%
ICFO	0	0%	1	0%	273	0%	1	0%	19	0%	0	0%	294	0%
ECOWAS2	0	0%	87	0%	104	0%	29	0%	73	0%	0	0%	293	0%
CERN	55	0%	9	0%	208	0%	6	0%	1	0%	2	0%	281	0%
SPC	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	2	0%	54	0%	216	1%	272	0%
IOM	16	0%	41	0%	120	0%	65	0%	18	0%	4	0%	264	0%
PIF	0	0%	0	0%	28	0%	8	0%	26	0%	173	1%	235	0%
GCC	0	0%	2	0%	133	0%	1	0%	53	0%	42	0%	231	0%
Benelux	43	0%	70	0%	95	0%	12	0%	7	0%	0	0%	227	0%
OIC	0	0%	2	0%	8	0%	12	0%	199	0%	1	0%	222	0%
UNIDO	12	0%	69	0%	77	0%	1	0%	3	0%	1	0%	163	0%
ComSec	0	0%	1	0%	130	0%	10	0%	0	0%	13	0%	154	0%
COMECON	0	0%	86	0%	22	0%	0	0%	7	0%	1	0%	116	0%
WMO	1	0%	5	0%	14	0%	26	0%	56	0%	11	0%	113	0%
BIS	2	0%	11	0%	35	0%	17	0%	36	0%	11	0%	112	0%
UPU	4	0%	0	0%	14	0%	27	0%	9	0%	44	0%	98	0%
NordC	0	0%	0	0%	32	0%	3	0%	62	0%	42	0%	97	0%
IGAD	0	0%	10	0%	54	0%	19	0%	13	0%	0	0%	96	0%
WCO	6	0%	1	0%	6	0%	22	0%	41	0%	20	0%	96	0%
CAN	0	0%	24	0%	7	0%	4	0%	45	0%	0	0%	80	0%
ITU	0	0%	2	0%	15	0%	5	0%	26	0%	8	0%	56	0%
UNWTO	0	0%	22	0%	8	0%	11	0%	4	0%	1	0%	46	0%
ISA	0	0%	2	0%	35	0%	0	0%	0	0%	2	0%	39	0%
EAC2	0	0%	3	0%	19	0%	3	0%	0	0%	0	0%	29	0%

OIF	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	20	0%	0	0%	0	0%	20	0%
OECS	0	0%	0	0%	2	0%	0	0%	14	0%	0	0%	16	0%
SAARC	0	0%	2	0%	8	0%	0	0%	6	0%	0	0%	16	0%
COMESA	0	0%	2	0%	12	0%	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%	15	0%
SCO	0	0%	0	0%	3	0%	4	0%	7	0%	0	0%	14	0%
SICA	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%	13	0%	0	0%	0	0%	14	0%
PCA	0	0%	0	0%	9	0%	0	0%	3	0%	0	0%	12	0%
SACU	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%	6	0%	0	0%	7	0%
CABI	0	0%	0	0%	4	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	4	0%
ECCAS	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%	1	0%	2	0%	0	0%	4	0%
CCNR	1	0%	0	0%	0	0%	2	0%	0	0%	0	0%	3	0%
AMU	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
CEMAC	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%
OAPEC	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1	0%	0	0%	1	0%
ALADI	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
OTIF	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
<b>Total</b>	42,450	100%	76,964	100%	280,979	100%	101,401	100%	131,298	100%	25,842	100%	658,938	100%

## 2 – Validation: Minimizing False Positives and False Negatives in IOParlspeech

Scholars using automated text analysis methods must validate their use (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). In particular, they should ensure that both false positives (in our case, capturing a statement which isn't in fact about an IO) and false negatives (excluding a statement that is in fact about an IO) are minimized. In our case, identifying statements about IOs requires using acronyms, but some of these could yield false positives. For instance, in the UK 'ISA' might refer

to the Individual Savings Account rather than the International Settlements Authority. In Germany, 'WIPO' is not simply an acronym for the World Intellectual Property Organization, but also for 'Wirtschaft/Politik' (Economics/Politics), a subject taught in secondary schools. To guard against false positives, we therefore employ a number of steps. First, handcoders were given a random sample of 5 hits from each acronym search string for each parliament. If any of these random samples returned one or more false positives, hand coders were asked to hand code the full sample hits using the acronyms. Altogether, 17 per cent of acronyms included a false positive, and hand coders coded over 900 additional hits to ensure false positives were excluded from the dataset.

False negatives could also be an issue for IOParlspeech. Parliamentarians might reference an IO without mentioning the IO's name directly by alluding to its policies. For instance, an MP that references the 'Millennium Development Goals' is implicitly referencing the UN. If the majority of mentions of an IO come from mentions of its policies or internal institutions, false negatives are likely to be a significant problem in IOParlspeech. If the majority of mentions of an IO come from direct references of the IO's name or acronym we can be confident that our method does a decent job of capturing the majority of parliamentary communication on IOs.

To show that our method does not exclude the majority of communication on IOs, we take the case where false negatives seem most likely. The EU, widely considered the most authoritative IO (Hagemann et al 2016) has a considerable policy output and a maze of institutions and agencies that make up the Brussels 'bubble'. Additionally, it also has the advantage of a validated dictionary of EU-level terms in English and German (see De Wilde and Rauh 2018), that includes a range of policy, institutional, and polity-related EU terms. Altogether, this dictionary consists of 78 EU-level terms in English, and 145 EU-level terms in German. We identify all EU-related parliamentary discourse based on these dictionaries, and find that in all six of our legislatures, the majority of EU communication is drawn from simple mentions of either the 'European Union' or the 'EU'. The figure is higher in non-EU member states (65% in USA, 71% in Canada, 61% in New Zealand) and lower in EU member states, who naturally reference EU policy and institutions more frequently. Even in these case however here the majority of EU references come from these two EU terms (51% In Germany, 58% in Austria, and 60% in the UK). We conclude that the prospect of false negatives, whilst undoubtedly



present in the dataset, does not fundamentally question the validity of the data collection process.

It is important to note here that false positives and negatives are unavoidable in quantitative models of language, and that all text as data are by nature ‘wrong’, in the sense that they cannot perfectly capture the variable of interest (in our case, the totality of IO communication in parliamentary debates). In their seminal article on automated text analysis, Grimmer and Stewart (2013) outline that the fact that ‘all automated methods are based on incorrect models of language also implies that models should be evaluated based on their ability to perform some useful social scientific task’. We believe our data generation achieve this criterion: through our efforts to minimize false positives through hand coding and through our analysis of the extent of false negatives in the case where these are most likely, we conclude that IOParlspeech provides a useful approximation of IO communication in parliamentary debate

**Table A3– English Dictionaries of all EU-level terms for validation**

EU polity	EU politics	EU policy
(eulec){1-9}{1,2}	ecb	(cle)sdp
(european europe's eu's) constitutional treaty	ecj	(common european) foreign and security polic(y)ies)
(romel maastricht amsterdam nicell lisbon) treat(y)ies)	ep	(common european) security and defen(sic)e polic(y)ies)
ec('s){0,1}	european (official(s){0,1} civil servant(s){0,1})	eurozoneeuro zoneeuro area
economic and monetary union	european (politics policy)	cfsp
eec('s){0,1}	european central bank	european ([a-z]* ){0,1}polic(y)ies)
emu	european commission(er ers){0,1}	european ([a-z]* ){0,1}(act(s){0,1} bill(s){0,1} law(s){0,1} legislation(s){0,1} statute(s){0,1})
eu('s){0,1}	european competenc(e es ies)	european ([a-z]* ){0,1}(aim(s){0,1} goal(s){0,1} target(s){0,1})
euratom('s){0,1}	european council	european ([a-z]* ){0,1}decision(s){0,1}
european ([a-z]* ){0,1}(integration unification cooperation)	european court of justice	european ([a-z]* ){0,1}directive(s){0,1}
european_communit(y)ies)	european election(s){0,1}	european ([a-z]* ){0,1}engagement(s){0,1}
european (economic  atomic energy )communit(y)ies)	european executive	european ([a-z]* ){0,1}guideline(s){0,1}
european institutions	european level(s){0,1}	european ([a-z]* ){0,1}(measure(s){0,1} action(s){0,1})
european project(s){0,1}	european member state(s){0,1}	european ([a-z]* ){0,1}(provision(s){0,1} prescription(s){0,1})
european treat(y)ies)	european parliament	european ([a-z]* ){0,1}(requirement(s){0,1} allowance(s){0,1})
european_union('s){0,1}	european procedure(s){0,1}	european ([a-z]* ){0,1}(standard(s){0,1} norm(s){0,1})
single european act	european summit(s){0,1}	european ([a-z]* ){0,1}agenda(s){0,1}
treat(y)ies) of (romel maastricht amsterdam nicell lisbon)	mep(s){0,1}	european ([a-z]* ){0,1}budget(s){0,1}
treaty establishing a constitution for europe	policy on europe	european ([a-z]* ){0,1}f(ulo)nd(s){0,1}
treaty on (the functioning of the ){0,1}european union		european ([a-z]* ){0,1}programme(s){0,1}
		european ([a-z]* ){0,1}regulation(s){0,1}
		european ([a-z]* ){0,1}strateg(y)ies)
		european (case-law jurisprudencel legal)
		european (single  internal )market{0,1}
		european [a-z]* union
		european currenc(y)ies)
		european mandate(s){0,1}
		police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters
		single currency
		stability and growth pact

**Table A4: German dictionary of all EU level terms for validation**

EU polity	EU politics	EU policy
europäische(n r){0,1} union	(eu eg)-kommission	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*politik(en){0,1}
europäische(n r){0,1} {atom wirtschafts}{0,1}gemeinschaft(en){0,1}	europäische(n r){0,1} kommission	europäische(n r){0,1} [a-zäöüß]*politik(en){0,1}
eu	(eu eg)-kommissar(e){0,1}	europäische(n r){0,1} [a-zäöüß]*union
eg	(eu eg)-kommissarin(nen){0,1}	europäische(n r){0,1} mandat(e)s{0,1}
ewg	europäische(n r){0,1} Kommissare(n){0,1}	europäische(n r){0,1} binnemarkt(s){0,1}
euratom	(eu eg)-beamte(n r){0,1}	einheitliche(n r){1} binnemarkt(s){0,1}
(eu eg)-vertr(ag ages ags äge){1}	europäische(n r){0,1} beamte(n r){0,1}	europäische(n r){0,1} [a-zäöüß]*integration
vertrag(s es){0,1} von (maastricht amsterdam nizza lissabon)	europäische(n){0,1} exekutive	gemeinsame(n r){0,1} außen- und sicherheitspolitik
(maastricht amsterdam nizza lissabon)-vertrag(s es){0,1}	europäische(n s){0,1} parlament(es s){0,1}	europäische(n r){0,1} außen- und sicherheitspolitik
(lissabonner amsterdamer) vertrag(es s){0,1}	europaparlament(es s){0,1}	polizeiliche(n r){0,1} und justizielle(n r){0,1} zusammenarbeit
einheitliche(n r){0,1} europäische(n r){0,1} akte	(eu eg)-parlament(es s){0,1}	europäische(n r){0,1} [a-zäöüß]*m(a ä)arkt(e s){0,1}
römische(n) verträge	ep	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*agenda
aeu-vertrag(es s){0,1}	europawahl(en){0,1}	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*haushalt(s){0,1}
eu-verfassung(svertrag svertrages){0,1}	europaabgeordnete(n r){0,1}	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*programm(s es)e{0,1}
europäische(n r){0,1} verfassung(svertrag svertrags svertrages){0,1}	(eu eg)-abgeordnete(n r){0,1}	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*regulierung(en){0,1}
(eu eg)-erweiterung(en){0,1}	(eu eg)-ministerrat(s){0,1}	europäische(r)n{0,1} [a-zäöüß]*regulierung(en){0,1}
europäische(n r){0,1} währungsunion	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*minister	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*vorschrift(en){0,1}
europa der [1-9]{1,2}	ratspräsidentschaft	europäische(r)n{0,1} [a-zäöüß]*vorschrift(en){0,1}
(eu eg)-[1-9]{1,2}	(eu eg)-ratspräsidentschaft	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*vorgabe(n){0,1}
europäische(n){0,1} projekt(es s){0,1}	europäische(r)n{0,1} [a-zäöüß]*rat(s){0,1}	europäische(r)n{0,1} [a-zäöüß]*vorgabe(n){0,1}
europäische(n r){0,1} einigung	(eu eg)-gipfel(n){0,1}	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*ziel(e){0,1}
europäische(n r){0,1} integration(sproze(ss ß) sproze(ss ß)e sproze(ss ß)es){0,1}	europagipfel(n){0,1}	europäische(n r){0,1} ziel(e){0,1}
(eu eg)-institution(en){0,1}	europäische(n r){0,1} gipfel(n){0,1}	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*maßnahmen
europäische(n r){0,1} institution(en){0,1}	(eu eg)-mitgliedstaat(en){0,1}	europäische(r)n{0,1} [a-zäöüß]*maßnahmen
wirtschafts- und währungsunion	europäische(n r){0,1} mitgliedstaat(en){0,1}	(eu eg)-instrumente(n){0,1}
ewu	(eu eg)-mitglieds(l and änder){1}	europäische(n r){0,1} instrumente(n){0,1}
wwu	europäische(n r){0,1} mitglieds(l and änder)	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*standard(s){0,1}
ewwu	(eu eg)-staat(en){0,1}	europäische(n r){0,1} standard(s){0,1}
	(eu eg)-l(and änder)	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*norm(en){0,1}
	europäische(r)n{0,1} gerichtshof(s){0,1}	europäische(n r){0,1} [a-zäöüß]*norm(en){0,1}
	eugh	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*zusammenarbeit
	(eu eg)-gerichtshof(es s){0,1}	europäische(n r){0,1} zusammenarbeit
	(eu eg)-gericht(s)e{0,1}	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*gesetzgebung
	europäische(n r){0,1} zentralbank	europäische(r)n{0,1} [a-zäöüß]*gesetzgebung
	ezb	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*gesetz(e){0,1}
	ezb-direktorium	europäische(s n r){0,1} [a-zäöüß]*gesetz(e){0,1}
	ezb-rat	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*recht(es s){0,1}
	hohe(r)n{0,1} vertreter(in s){0,1} für außen- und sicherheitspolitik	europarecht(es s){0,1}
	europapolitik	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*rechtsetzung
	europäische(r)n{0,1} ebene	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*richtlinie(n){0,1}
	(eu eg)-ebene	europäische(n r){0,1} [a-zäöüß]*richtlinie(n){0,1}
	europäische(n r){0,1} verfahren	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*verordnung(en){0,1}
	europabühne	europäische(n r){0,1} [a-zäöüß]*verordnung(en){0,1}
	(eu eg)-kompetenz(en){0,1}	(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*entscheidung(en){0,1}
	europäische(n r){0,1} kompetenz(en){0,1}	europäische(n r){0,1} [a-zäöüß]*entscheidung(en){0,1}
		(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*leitlinie(n){0,1}
		europäische(n r){0,1} [a-zäöüß]*leitlinie(n){0,1}
		(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*reform(en){0,1}
		(eu eg)-engagement(s){0,1}
		(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*strategie(n){0,1}
		europäische(n r){0,1} [a-zäöüß]*strategie(n){0,1}
		europäische(n r){0,1} sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitik
		esvp
		europäische(n r){0,1} sicherheits- und verteidigungsunion
		esvu
		gemeinsame(n r){0,1} sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitik
		europäische(n r){0,1} recht(sprechung sordnung setzung){0,1}
		europäische(n s){0,1} [a-zäöüß]*recht(es s){0,1}
		vertragsverletzungsverfahren
		vorabentscheidungsverfahren
		aeuv
		europäische(n r){0,1} währung(en){0,1}
		(eu eg)-währung(en){0,1}
		gemeinschaftswährung
		eurozone
		euro-zone
		euroraum(s){0,1}
		euro-raum(s){0,1}
		europäische(n r){0,1} [a-zäöüß]*fonds
		(eu eg)-[a-zäöüß]*fonds
		stabilitäts- und wachstumspakt(s){0,1}

### 3 – Ratified International Organizations and International Parliamentary Institutions

Below is the list of IOs where membership was ratified during the investigation period (1990 -2018) by at least one of the countries in IOParlspeech. Note that due to data availability restrictions, the Austrian parliamentary speech data begins in 1996. Table A6 includes the IOs that have international parliamentary institutions.

**Table A5– Ratified International Organizations**

<b>Ratified IO</b>	<b>Ratification Year</b>
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)	1993 (CAN, USA)
European Economic Area (EEA)	1992 (AT), 1993 (UK, DE)
European Union (EU)	1993 (UK, DE, AT)
International Criminal Court (ICC)	2000 (DE, AT, CAN, NZ) 2001 (UK)
World Trade Organization (WTO)	1994 (UK, USA, CAN, DE, AT)
Global Environment Facility (GEF)	1991 (AT, DE, CAN, UK, USA, NZ)
International Seabed Authority (ISA)	1994 (AT, DE, CAN, UK, USA, NZ)

**Table A6–IOs in IOParlspeech with International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs)**

<b>IO with International Parliamentary Institution (IPI)</b>	<b>IPI present ...</b>
OIF	During full investigation period
AMU	During full investigation period
CAN	During full investigation period
APEC	Since 1993
ASEAN	During full investigation period
Benelux	During full investigation period
Caricom	Since 1996
CEMAC	Since 2010
CIS	Since 1992
COE	During full investigation period

EAC	Since 2001
ECCAS	Since 2002
ECOWAS	Since 2001
EEA	During full investigation period
EFTA	During full investigation period
EU	During full investigation period
IGAD	Since 2008
LOAS	Since 2005
Mercosur	Since 1994
NATO	During full investigation period
NordC	During full investigation period
AU	Since 2004
OECS	Since 2012
OIC	Since 1999
OSCE	Since 1991
SADC	Since 1996
SICA	Since 1994

**Table A7 – Summary Statistic of Continuous Dependent and Independent Variables**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
IO Counts	12,049	52.99	433.2584	0	20726
Authority	4,159	1.5985	1.130825	0	4.9428
Delegation	12,049	0.21446	0.1431315	0	0.65200
Pooling	12,049	0.308884	0.1704232	0.006875	0.688333
Unemployment	12,049	6.578	1.891629	3.380	11.380
Challenger Share	12,049	0.1412	0.1188987	0	0.4153
Economic Crises	12,049	9.608	8.11137	0	34
Security Crises	12,049	8.61	3.033	4	14

**Table A8 – Summary Statistic of Categorical Independent Variables**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Summary</b>
Member	12,049	Member: 6,435 Not Member: 5,614
International Parl. Institution	12,049	IPI Presence: 3,473 No IPI Presence: 8,576
Election Year	12,049	Election Year: 3,747 Not Election Year: 8,302
Ratification Year	12,049	Ratification Year: 26 Not Ratification Year: 12,023
Contract	12,049	General Purpose: 4,808 Task Specific: 7,241
IO Issue Area	12,049	Economic: 6,711 Political: 3,206 Social: 2,132
Economic Crisis	12,049	Economic Crisis: 296 No Economic Crisis: 11,753
Security Crisis	12,049	Security Crisis: 1,452 No Security Crisis: 10,597

#### 4. Robustness Tests

**Table A9: Sample without the top 1% of (overdispersed) observations**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
IO authority (overall)	3.155*** (0.943)			3.308*** (0.947)		3.398*** (0.954)	
IO delegation		-0.028 (0.676)	-3.026*** (1.114)		0.038 (0.677)		-0.282 (0.691)
IO pooling		4.522*** (1.004)	2.008 (1.248)		4.633*** (1.006)		4.790*** (1.005)
delegation*pooling			12.287*** (3.643)				
Authority * challengershare						-2.246 (1.392)	
delegation*challengershare							1.553 (1.171)
pooling*challengershare							- 2.854*** (0.916)
general purpose	1.247** (0.542)	1.412** (0.574)	1.578*** (0.569)	1.244** (0.543)	1.414** (0.575)	1.239** (0.542)	1.399** (0.572)
IPA Dummy	1.032*** (0.186)	1.064*** (0.187)	0.980*** (0.188)	1.023*** (0.186)	1.054*** (0.187)	1.023*** (0.186)	1.063*** (0.187)
ratification year	0.980** (0.476)	0.988** (0.474)	0.999** (0.470)	0.971** (0.476)	0.978** (0.474)	0.990** (0.477)	0.998** (0.472)
intl. economic crises	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
intl. security crises	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.012 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.012)
economic IO	0.118 (0.798)	0.565 (0.837)	0.534 (0.844)	0.125 (0.802)	0.570 (0.841)	0.116 (0.797)	0.545 (0.835)
political IO	0.879 (0.920)	1.235 (0.959)	1.071 (0.968)	0.623 (0.935)	0.970 (0.974)	0.879 (0.919)	1.219 (0.957)
Economic crisis * economic IO				0.001 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)		
Security crisis * political IO				0.032 (0.020)	0.033* (0.020)		
legislative elections	- 0.374*** (0.045)	- 0.373*** (0.045)	-0.372*** (0.045)	- 0.373*** (0.045)	- 0.372*** (0.045)	- 0.373*** (0.045)	- 0.373*** (0.045)
IO member	3.009*** (0.082)	3.006*** (0.081)	3.009*** (0.081)	3.009*** (0.081)	3.006*** (0.081)	3.001*** (0.082)	2.999*** (0.081)

Challenger seat share	0.635 (0.446)	0.646 (0.446)	0.681 (0.445)	0.639 (0.446)	0.650 (0.446)	1.275** (0.597)	1.227** (0.597)
Unemployment	-0.022 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.019)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.019)	-0.021 (0.019)
Constant	8.590*** (1.140)	9.728*** (1.229)	-9.360*** (1.229)	8.544*** (1.142)	9.693*** (1.232)	8.628*** (1.140)	9.725*** (1.227)
<i>Random effects</i>							
IO-level variance	7.069*** (1.205)	7.629*** (1.309)	7.752*** (1.336)	7.071*** (1.206)	7.650*** (1.314)	7.058*** (1.202)	7.583*** (1.301)
year-level variance	0.638*** (0.047)	0.628*** (0.046)	0.618*** (0.046)	0.633*** (0.047)	0.623*** (0.046)	0.638*** (0.047)	0.626*** (0.046)
Log Pseudo~d	-22882	-22877	-22871	-22881	-22875	-22881	-22871
bic	46074	46072	46070	46090	46088	46080	46080
Observations	11928	11928	11928	11928	11928	11928	11928

**Table A10: Robustness to using Zürn's (2020) measure of IO authority**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
IO authority (overall)	0.184*	0.196*	0.096
	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Authority * challengershare			0.703***
			(0.180)
general purpose IO	-1.362*	-1.344*	-1.384*
	(0.781)	(0.780)	(0.785)
IPA Dummy	1.529***	1.521***	1.550***
	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.223)
ratification year	1.031*	0.975*	0.976*
	(0.542)	(0.543)	(0.538)
intl. economic crises	0.003	-0.001	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)
intl. security crises	-0.003	-0.007	-0.003
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)
economic IO	0.037	-0.053	0.056
	(0.978)	(0.981)	(0.983)
political IO	0.594	0.503	0.617
	(1.113)	(1.132)	(1.118)
Economic crisis * economic IO		0.009	
		(0.009)	
Security crisis * political IO		0.011	
		(0.028)	
legislative elections	-0.402***	-0.403***	-0.400***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.057)
IO member	3.023***	3.025***	3.037***
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.090)
Challenger seat share	-0.968	-0.967	-2.272***
	(0.613)	(0.613)	(0.697)
Unemployment	-0.023	-0.023	-0.023
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Constant	-3.433**	-3.352**	-3.279**
	(1.444)	(1.444)	(1.447)
<i>Random effects</i>			
IO-level variance	4.266***	4.248***	4.289***
	(1.162)	(1.157)	(1.168)
year-level variance	0.443***	0.441***	0.432***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)
Log Pseudo~d	-12299	-12299	-12292
bic	24874	24890	24867
Observations	4159	4159	4159